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MAJOR COURT DECISIONS, SPRING 2000
UNITED STATES V. PLAYBOY ENTERTAIN-
MENT GROUP, INC. __ U.S. -, No. 98-1682
(May 22, 2000).
Issue: Whether Section 505 of the Communica-
tions Decency Act ("CDA"), which requires cable
television operators to fully scramble channels pri-
marily dedicated to sexually oriented program-
ming during the hours of 10 p.m. and 6 a.m., vio-
lates the First Amendment.
Holding: The Supreme Court found Section
505 a content-based restriction on speech and
that less restrictive means were available to
achieve the government's objectives.
Discussion: Section 505 of the CDA requires
cable operators to entirely block signal bleed on
channels where the content is primarily dedicated
to sexually oriented programming. Or, in the al-
ternative, operators are required to restrict such
programming to the hours between 10 p.m. and 6
a.m. Signal bleed is the viewable and/or audible
portion of the signal for which the subscriber has
not paid.
Appellee Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc.,
challenged the statute as a content-based restric-
tion that was violative of the First Amendment.
Congress' purpose in enacting Section 505 was to
shield children from hearing or seeing sexually
oriented programming resulting from signal
bleed between the hours of 10 p.m. and 6 a.m.
The government argued that cable operators
often inadequately scramble programming; there-
fore, children can either hear or see portions of
the programming. In addition, the government
argued that many adults themselves would find
the material highly offensive, and that the mate-
rial comes unwanted into homes where children
might see or hear it against parental consent. Nev-
ertheless, the Court determined Section 505 was a
content-based restriction deserving strict scrutiny
under the First Amendment, because the statute
defined the speech by its content.
The Court found that a substantial number of
cable operators chose to blackout channels con-
taining sexually oriented programming for two-
thirds of the day in every home regardless of the
presence or likely presence of children, and at the
request of viewers. The Court held that the statute
did not pass strict scrutiny, because there is a plau-
sible, less restrictive alternative found in Section
504 of the CDA. Section 504 requires a cable op-
erator, "upon request by a cable service subscriber
... without charge, [to] fully scramble or other-
wise fully block" any channel the subscriber does
not wish to receive. The Court found, "Even upon
the assumption that the [g]overnment has an in-
terest in substituting itself for informed and em-
powered parents, its interest is not sufficiently
compelling to justify this widespread restriction
on speech." The Court found against the govern-
ment because it failed to show that Section 505
was not the least restrictive means for addressing a
compelling interest.
TIME WARNER ENTERTAINMENT CO. V.
UNITED STATES 211 F.3d 1313 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
Issue: Whether the "subscriber limits provision"
and the "channel occupancy provision" of the
Cable Television Consumer Protection and Com-
petition Act of 1992 (the "Cable Act") are consti-
tutional.
Holding: The court held that both provisions of
the Cable Act were constitutional, and thus re-
versed in part and affirmed in part the lower
court's ruling. The court held that both provi-
sions were content neutral, and each provision
sought to protect competition and therefore ad-
vanced an important government interest unre-
lated to the suppression of speech.
Discussion: Time Warner and other cable televi-
sion system owners challenged the constitutional-
ity of the subscriber limits provision and the chan-
nel occupancy provision of the Cable Act. The
subscriber limits provision restricts the number of
subscribers a cable operator can reach. Similarly,
the channel occupancy provision restricted the
amount of programming in which a cable opera-
tor may have a financial interest. The district
court ruled that the subscriber limits provision
and the channel occupancy provision were un-
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constitutional. The circuit court held that both
provisions were content neutral. The Cable Act
was enacted to protect the availability of outlets
for unpopular speech. The court accepted the
government's argument that the subscriber limits
provision protected against market concentration
that would threaten competition and the diversity
of speech. Likewise, the channel occupancy provi-
sion protects against the possible anti-competitive
effect of vertically integrated program suppliers.
Vertically integrated program suppliers have in-
centives to favor affiliated cable operators over
unaffiliated cable operators at the consumer's ex-
pense and therefore would decrease the diversity
of speech.
MCI WORLDCOM, INC. V. FCC 209 F.3d 760
(D.C. Cir. 2000).
Issue: Whether the Federal Communications
Commission ("the Commission" or "FCC") im-
properly ordered the mandatory detariffing of in-
terexchange carriers in violation of the Telecom-
munications Act of 1996 (the "1996 Act").
Holding: The court denied a petition for review
of the FCC's mandatory detariffing decision.
Discussion: Petitioners sought review of the FCC
order prohibiting them from filing tariffs with the
Commission. Section 203(a) of the Communica-
tions Act of 1934 ("the Act") required telecommu-
nication carriers to file tariffs with the FCC to en-
sure that the carriers were charging consumers
reasonable prices. The Telecommunications Act
of 1996 mandates the FCC avoid applying any reg-
ulation or provision to a carrier that the FCC de-
termines is unnecessary for consumer protection,
or is not needed to guard against discrimination
or other improper acts. Thus, the 1996 Act per-
mits the FCC to dispense with Section 203(a) of
the Act. The court held that no provision of the
Act provided carriers with a right to file tariffs,
and the FCC was no longer obligated to accept
such filings. The Commission argued voluntary fil-
ings would undermine the increased competitive
effect of detariffing and should be forbidden. The
court ruled that the Commission's desire to emu-
late a free market and move toward an unregu-
lated environment were reasonable enough to
substantiate its ruling.
AT&T WIRELESS PCS, INC. V. CITY OF AT-
LANTA 210 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 2000).
Issue: Whether the 1996 Act contains a reme-
dial scheme sufficient to preclude a separate
cause of action to enforce the 1996 Act under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.
Holding: The court of appeals held that the Sec-
tion 1983 remedies are available, and vacated and
remanded the case.
Discussion: A provider of personal wireless ser-
vice sued the City of Atlanta for denial of a special
use permit, and sought compensatory damages
pursuant to Section 1983 and a violation of the
1996 Act. The Northern District Court for the Dis-
trict of Georgia issued mandamus but denied re-
lief under Section 1983. AT&T Wireless received a
special administrative permit to provide personal
wireless service in Atlanta. Section 1983 provides
remedies for both constitutional violations as well
as a broad remedy for violations of federally cre-
ated rights. These remedies are not available,
however, in actions for violations of all federal
statutes.
The 1996 Act permits any person adversely af-
fected by state or local action to sue in any court
of competentjurisdiction, and binds the state and
local governments to refrain from discrimination.
Therefore, the Telecommunications Act was in-
tended to create a federal right. However, the
1996 Act contains an express directive that it
would not have any implied effect upon any other
laws other than those specifically provided for
within the act itself. As the Telecommunications
Act contained only express exclusions regarding
tax and antitrust laws, AT&T could pursue reme-
dies under Section 1983.
PETERSBURG CELLULAR PARTNERSHIP V.
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF NOTTOWAY
COUNTY 205 F.3d 688 (4th Cir. 2000).
Issue: Whether a local zoning board's denial of
a special use permit for the construction of a wire-
less communications tower is in violation of the
1996 Act.
Holding: The 1996 Act cannot require a county
to grant a zoning permit under the Tenth Amend-
ment because it would be directing local govern-
ments to employ federal standards when zoning.
Discussion: A telecommunications provider ap-
plied for a conditional use permit to the zoning
administrator to erect a wireless communications
tower. The local board voted unanimously to deny
the permit. The provider claimed that the board's
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actions violated Section 704(a) of the Telecom-
munications Act, which prevents barriers to entry.
Residents opposed the construction of the tower
out of fear of children climbing the tower, the
possibility that pilots may confuse the lights on
the tower and the lights at a nearby airport, and
the possibility that the tower may suffer structural
difficulties and collapse. The court found that the
residents' concerns for the construction were un-
reasonable. Nevertheless, the 1996 Act violates the
Tenth Amendment by coercing the local govern-
ments to apply federal rules in zoning and land
use.
TCG DETROIT V. CITY OF DEARBORN 206
F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2000).
Issue: Whether a city's requirement that a pro-
posed telecommunications provider pay the city a
franchise fee for the privilege of laying fiber optic
cable is a violation of the 1996 Act.
Holding: The franchise fee that a proposed tele-
communications provider was forced to pay was
fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory.
Discussion: TCG, a proposed telecommunica-
tions provider, negotiated with the city to lay
twenty-seven miles of cable in the city and pay a
one time fee to reimburse the city for administra-
tive costs. The city backed away from the negotia-
tions and required a franchise fee. TCG claims
that the city's demand for a franchise fee was in
violation of Section 253 of the 1996 Act, which re-
quires removal of barriers to entry. The court
held that the franchise fee was reasonable and
competitively neutral. When determining whether
the fee was fair and reasonable, the court consid-
ered the amount of wire the company planned to
lay, the amount other providers were willing to
pay and the fact that TCG had agreed previously
to a fee almost identical to the one the city is now
charging.
FREEMAN V. BURLINGTON BROADCASTERS,
INC., D/B/A/ WINZ 204 F.3d 311 (2nd Cir. 2000).
Issue: Whether a city zoning administration can
hold a radio station operator, cellular phone com-
pany, and a city fire and ambulance service in vio-
lation of city ordinances for interfering with elec-
tronic devices in private homes.
Holding: The federal government regulates ra-
dio frequency interference and therefore city or-
dinances governing radio frequency are pre-
empted by federal law.
Discussion: A radio station, cellular phone com-
pany, and a city fire and ambulance service were
all in violation of a broadcast tower permit condi-
tion. The city, however, did not have the authority
to enforce the permit condition because radio fre-
quency interference is governed by federal law.
Federal law preempts the city ordinance. The
court considered Congress' intent when enacting
the law to determine whether Congress left room
for states to supplement the federal regulation.
The federal law preempted the field of radio fre-
quency interference because the statute grants
the FCC broad authority over the issue. Also, the
legislative history of the 1982 Amendments to the
Act lends support that Congress intended to grant
the FCC exclusive power to regulate.
KNIGHTS OF THE Ku KLux KLAN V. CURA-
TORS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI 203
F.3d 1085 (8th Cir. 2000).
Issue: Whether a state Ku Klux Klan and its co-
ordinator's First and Fourteenth Amendment
rights were violated when a state university's cura-
tors and the general manager of a not-for-profit
public broadcast radio station denied the Klan's
application to underwrite radio programming.
Holding: The court of appeals affirmed the dis-
trict court's holding that the station's underwrit-
ing acknowledgments were governmental speech
on the part of the university. The underwriting
program was immune from First Amendment fo-
rum analysis, which requires that censorship of
speech be adequately related to matters of edito-
rial or journalistic discretion. Also, the court de-
termined that the forum analysis was not applica-
ble just because the university created an
underwriting program.
Discussion: The court rejected the Ku Klux
Klan's forum argument because the radio sta-
tion's underwriting acknowledgments were gov-
ernmental speech on behalf of the University.
The central purpose of the enhanced underwrit-
ing program is not to promote the views of the
donors, but to acknowledge any consideration ac-
cepted by the station with respect to the broad-
cast. Therefore, the station's underwriting ac-
knowledgments are federally mandated
sponsorship identifications. In effect, by accepting
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or rejecting the funds of underwriters, the station
is making a governmental decision whether to
speak or remain silent.
The court also found that even if a forum analy-
sis had applied, the station had editorial discre-
tion about what material to broadcast, which in-
cluded underwriting acknowledgments. Because
accepting funds from the Ku Klux Klan would
trigger statutorily mandated publication, the uni-
versity used its editorial discretion to reject the
proposed sponsorship, choosing to remain silent.
Finally, the court found that the university insti-
tuted the underwriting program to gather finan-
cial support for the station and to briefly identify
its underwriters, not to communicate the views of
its underwriters.
ALLENCO, INC. V. FCC 201 F.3d 608 (5th Cir.
2000).
Issue: Whether two orders issued by the FCC,
promulgated to satisfy Congress' dual mandates
to provide universal service and inject competi-
tion into the market for local telephone service,
were in violation of the Administrative Procedure
Act and the Takings Clause, and in noncompli-
ance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
Holding: The court of appeals denied the peti-
tions for review, finding that the petitioner's local
telephone service providers fundamentally mis-
construed the primary purpose of the 1996 Act,
which intended to provide competition in local
telephone service markets while continuing to
pursue the goal of universal service.
Discussion: The court rejected the petitions of
the local exchange carriers, holding that the 1996
Act was meant to introduce competition into the
market and does not guarantee economic success
for all providers. In addition, the court noted that
the promise of universal service requires sufficient
funding for customers, not providers. The peti-
tioners did not demonstrate that various changes
to the universal support fund for high-cost loops
failed to provide sufficient funding for universal
service. They also failed to show that the changes
in the treatment of charges paid by interexchange
carriers unreasonably failed to provide sufficient
and explicit funding for universal service. The
court rejected petitioner's takings clause chal-
lenge as premature. Finally, the court held that
the FCC's orders complied with the Regulatory
Flexibility Act.
CELLULAR PHONE TASKFORCE v. FCC 205
F.3d 82 (2nd Cir. 2000).
Issue: Whether the FCC acted lawfully in
promulgating guidelines for health and safety
standards for radio frequency radiation.
Holding: The court upheld the regulations,
finding that the FCC acted reasonably by relying
on the health and safety standards for radio fre-
quency radiation issued by the American National
Standards Institute and National Council on Radi-
ation Protection and Measurements in setting the
guidelines.
Discussion: In upholding the regulations, the
court held that the FCC acted within its discretion
to not require operators to submit new evidence
to other federal agencies in the environmental as-
sessment area. Rather, the FCC could reasonably
expect those agencies to keep abreast of recent
developments in carrying out their missions. The
court further held that the FCC's actions were not
arbitrary or capricious in exempting certain licen-
sees from filing routine environmental assess-
ments or in setting maximum permitted exposure
levels. Finally, the court found that the FCC was
not required under the National Environmental
Policy Act to prepare an environmental impact
statement. The agency reasonably interpreted the
preemption provision of the 1996 Act, and the
preemption provision did not violate the Tenth
Amendment of the Constitution.
BELL ATLANTIC TELEPHONE Co. v. FCC
206 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
Issue: The court faced the question of whether
calls made to an Internet Service Provider ("ISP")
are local or long distance. The 1996 Act estab-
lished reciprocal compensation for local ex-
change carriers ("LECs") so that both the origina-
tor and recipient receive payment for the call.
The FCC limited the scope of reciprocal compen-
sation to local calls only. For this reason, if calls to
ISPs are found to be long distance, compensation
need not be reciprocated. Utilizing an end-to-end
analysis, the FCC determined that because the na-
ture of the internet is international and therefore,
many calls will extend beyond state borders, calls
to ISPs are nonlocal.
Holding: Finding an inadequate explanation
for the FCC's determination that calls to ISPs are
nonlocal, the court vacated the ruling and re-
manded the case. It noted that simply because
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there are further communications after the call
reaches the ISP does not mean that the original
call cannot terminate at the ISP, making the call
local. The FCC must further explain why it is nec-
essary to view the transaction as one continuous
call momentarily pausing en route, rather than
multiple calls terminating at each destination.
Discussion: To reach its decision, the court
closely examined the FCC's choice of an end-to-
end analysis and the application thereof. Such
analysis is typically utilized to decide jurisdictional
questions. Its application to the instant question is
inappropriate.
In fact, calls to ISPs do not fit neatly within the
idea of local or long-distance calls. The court sug-
gested that possibly the most logical way of look-
ing at an ISP is as a "communications intensive
business end user selling a product to other con-
sumer and business end users." Given the fact that
on prior occasions the FCC admitted that ISPs are
not easily categorized and that the classifications
present conflicts with earlier statements, the court
felt that the FCC needed to clarify its rationale.
GTE SERVICE CORP. V. FEDERAL COMMUNI-
CATIONS COMMISSION 205 F.3d 416 (D.C. Cir.
2000).
Issue: The petitioners in this case are incum-
bent LECs who challenge definitions of the terms
"necessary" and "physical collocation" within the
FCC's Collocation Order pursuant to 47 U.S.C.
§ 251 (c) (6). The central issue in this case is
whether the FCC's interpretation of the statute
can withstand judicial scrutiny. The statute pro-
vides that incumbent LECs must "provide for
physical collocation of equipment necessary for
interconnection or access to unbundled network
elements at the premises of the local exchange
carrier."
Holding: The court determined that the FCC's
definitions of "necessary" and "physical colloca-
tion" are impermissibly broad and vacated those
parts of the opinion. It rejected the arguments
that the definition of "premises" is overbroad, that
"physical collocation" was meant to be limited to
"cageless collocation" or that the cost recovery
mechanism requires incumbent LECs to "pay" to
have their property taken.
Discussion: Interpreting the term "necessary,"
the FCC states that an incumbent LEC may not
refuse collocation of any equipment that is "used
or useful" in meeting the statute's mandate. Addi-
tionally, the Collocation Order provides that it is
immaterial whether the equipment includes "en-
hanced capabilities or other functionalities." By
examining Supreme Court precedent, the court
determined that Congress meant to use the plain
meaning of "necessary." The FCC ignores the nat-
ural language in favor of efficiency, which it may
not do.
In contrast, the FCC's understanding of "physi-
cal collocation" is not overly broad. Because Con-
gress chose not to define terms within the section,
and there is no suggestion of prohibition, the
court found the requirement of cageless colloca-
tion availability reasonable.
The court did, however, find the regulation re-
quiring the incumbent LEC to allow the competi-
tor to choose their location within the LEC's
property indefensible. Because the FCC could not
furnish a sensible reason for requiring a LEC to
give up property rights, the court determined that
it might result in an unnecessary taking.
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